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Introduction 
The popular uprisings commonly known as Arab Spring have been a challenge for 
analysts in the field of Political Science and International Politics. Whole populations 
rose against corrupt and authoritarian political elites which had controlled their lives 
for too long and eventually achieved their goals at least in Tunisia and Egypt, where the 
former rulers were removed from power. Some elements of these popular uprisings 
are striking: the resilience, determination, and peacefulness of the demonstrators; the 
virtual absence of a recognizable leader or of a defined political project; the gradual 
contagion effect from these two trendsetters to the whole Maghreb and Middle East; 
the role played by the media and individual tools of communications in the 
dissemination of the events; the non-direct interference of external actors on each of 
the uprisings, with the exception of Libya and Bahrain.  
The revolution in Libya seems to be somehow dissonant in the creation of a linear 
narrative around this Arab Spring, since an international military intervention was 
necessary to stop the slaughter of Libyan civilians at the hand of its own government, 
which was toppled consequently. But within the framework of international 
interventions mandated by the United Nations (UN), this has been a unique moment 
as well, since this decision of the Security Council (SC) to mandate an international 
force referring explicitly to the a responsibility to protect. Although not unique in itself, 
this intervention eventually opens the possibility to the resort of the concept of 
“Responsibility to protect” (R2P) for interventions in the future. 
                                                          
1 This paper is a draft, please do not quote without the author’s authorization. Please contact: pascoal-
pereira@hotmail.com.  
2 PhD candidate in International Politics and Conflict Resolution at the Faculty of Economics and Centre 
for Social Studies, University of Coimbra (Portugal). Funded with a scholarship of the Portuguese 
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (reference SFRH/ BD/ 44034/ 2008). 
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This double uniqueness of Libya is the main driver of this paper, which aims at 
understanding, on the one hand, the consequences of this intervention, in future 
international actions of this sort. On the other hand, this attempt to make sense of the 
discourse of R2P brought some other narratives to the surface which might be helpful 
to be explored and mapped. The first section is an outline of the world order after the 
end of the Cold War, as an introduction to the second section, in which we line up the 
main ideas behind the responsibility to protect. In the third section, I will address the 
use of this principle of R2P as a background for the intervention in Libya, in a UN 
mission mandated for the first time using this specific conceptual corpus. The last 
section will be a mapping exercise of the different narratives that meet, collide and 
reinforce mutually in the context of the revolutions in the Arab world and more 
specifically in the context of the intervention on Libya. 
 
The end of the Cold War and a new frame for humanitarian international 
interventions 
The end of the Cold War represented the possibility of overcoming the former 
geopolitical framework based on the military balance of power and nuclear deterrence 
between the two superpowers of the time, which had shaped the International 
Relations since the Second World War. The events in 1989 represented what, for 
some, was an end of History, (Fukuyama, 1992) as Western democracies and values 
defeated their counterpart and were therefore allowed to settle a liberal order based 
on rules and institutions; this liberal order would stress the priority on protecting 
individual rights, whereas the previous more realist framework prioritized state 
security (Chandler, 2004). This order was already drafted since 1945 within the United 
Nations (UN) system, but its potential impact in ruling international peace and security 
was undermined by the bipolar contention. 
The international consensus on the primacy of the SC was evident if we consider its 
legitimizing role during the Gulf War in 1990-1; but it was soon obscured by a new set 
of events which impeded this procedure to be repeated. The inability of the 
international community in supplying a proper reply to new wars (Kaldor, 2007) proved 
that the UN structure was insufficient and inadequate for a proper response to this 
new kind of crises. These conflicts were not necessarily new in themselves; they rather 
belonged to a new typology of conflicts: the “classical” wars were mainly waged 
between states and the aggressor was external; in the post-Cold War era, conflicts are 
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mainly waged inside states and the repressor is internal (Kaldor, 2007: 123). These 
were also conflicts which rose in eroded or disintegrated states and in which identity 
politics became a central discourse (Kaldor, 2007: 180). Even though major 
humanitarian crisis in the 1990s such as in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Northern Iraq were 
not unprecedented, the international indifference could almost be considered as 
immoral given the dimension of the reported violations of the human rights. But a 
right/obligation to intervene, even for humanitarian purposes, was undermined by the 
principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in domestic jurisdiction, some of 
the most solid principles of International Relations and actual cornerstones in the 
attempt to achieve a peaceful international community. 
The dead-lock in which the international community was trapped was evident at its 
outmost during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when a group of states undertook a joint 
military action against Yugoslavia in order to force Belgrade to stop the severe 
violations of human rights on the Albanian population in Kosovo. This war was waged 
in the name of the protection of human life and was even considered by the then 
British Prime-Minister Tony Blair, to be fought, not for territory, but for values 
(Chandler, 2004: 75), and thus a moral war to be fought for. Even if the intervening 
states justified their action with its moral legitimacy, this intervention was illegal since it 
lacked the formal authority of a SC resolution (Chandler, 2004: 59).3  
Legitimacy and legality could not remain in such a pronounced opposition; an exact 
definition and framework for the application of this obligation to intervene became a 
priority. Thus, in his annual report to the General Assembly in 2000 (UN Secretary 
General, 2000), the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the international 
community to define the exact terms of such a framework. The challenge was taken by 
the Canadian government which formed an International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) for that purpose. 
 
  
                                                          
3 Even though this argument was not used as a justification for this intervention, the fact that it was 
backed by a significant number of democracies helped to the conception of a “limited intervention” 
theory in which one of the legitimating criteria for intervention was the total number and the level of 
democracy of the intervening States (Ortega, 2001) 
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A Responsibility to Protect Human Lives 
The ICISS brought its final report The responsibility to protect to Kofi Annan one year 
later. The title of the report points at two important elements: first, this responsibility 
to protect seems to spin from the “sovereignty as responsibility” proposed by Francis 
Deng and Roberta Cohen in the 1990s, concerning the protection of the internally 
displaced (Bellamy, 2008). On the one hand, this sovereignty as responsibility assumes 
that the sovereign state is responsible for protecting the life of the population living in 
its territory. On the other hand, this would imply that the state would lose its 
legitimate sovereignty in case it could not protect its own population. The second 
element is the calculated move from a right to intervention to a responsibility to protect 
(Bellamy, 2008: 622). As a “right”, it would have been too easily associated to 
unilateralism or to violation of the principle of non-intervention, jeopardizing the 
purpose of the report by the skepticism it would raise (ICISS, 2001: 11). The same 
argument may be used for justifying the focus on “protection” instead of 
“intervention” (Evans, 2008).  
The report, explicitly based on human security, presents four basic objectives for a 
new approach on interventions for humanitarian protection: to establish rules, 
procedures and criteria to determine whether, when and how to intervene; to 
legitimize military interventions when necessary, when all alternative actions have 
failed; to ensure that intervention is carried out only for the purposes proposed and is 
undertaken with proper concern to minimize human costs; and to help to remove the 
causes of conflict and to establish the conditions for a durable and sustainable peace 
(ICISS, 2001: 11). 
The document is divided in three central components which form the broader concept 
of responsibility to protect: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react 
and the responsibility to rebuild. Interventions were also bound to a set of six criteria 
for justifying them in extreme situations: right authority, just cause, right intention, last 
resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.  
The ICISS emphasized two of these criteria, namely just cause and appropriate 
authority, the two most controversial when it comes to intervention. Interventions 
with a just cause would take place to stop large scale loss of life, as a product either of: 
deliberate state action; state neglect or inability to act; a failed state situation; or to 
avert large scale ethnic cleansing, carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror 
or rape, either actual or apprehended (ICISS, 2001: 32). As to the decision and 
Pascoal Santos Pereira  Libya 
 
Série Comunicações, FEUC, 2013  5 
implementation of interventions, the central role and first instance is undoubtedly 
assigned to the SC, as a proper, authoritative and credible institution (ICISS, 2001: 49). 
Any humanitarian intervention aiming at protecting endangered human lives should be 
mandated by the SC. 
Nevertheless, the members of the ICISS were critical of the SC at the same time and 
mapped a set of objections to its legitimacy, to the way it operates and to its structure; 
even some recommendations for reform were suggested in the report. Their major 
remark concerns the fact that the SC is not representative of the current world and 
that it lacks democratic legitimacy: on the one hand, the current permanent members 
of the SC have a veto power, but there are no permanent members from Latin 
America or Africa; on the other hand, it has proven to be ineffective too often, when 
its prompt reaction might have saved many lives. Beyond this suggested ambitious 
reform and a reminder on alternatives to a blockade of the SC, within the UN 
institutions and by the use of the Uniting for Peace procedure (UN General Assembly, 
1950), the Commission also opened the way to interventions led by regional 
international organizations or ad hoc coalitions of neighboring states (out of area 
interventions would be more controversial), which can be legitimized by the UN 
afterwards (ICISS, 2001: 49-52). At this point, the ICISS gives the SC two 
recommendations: its inaction would push towards interventions by ad hoc coalitions, 
outside of the UN discipline and rules and possibly far from its guiding principles; and 
any successful intervention out of its authority would jeopardize the UN and its 
credibility (ICISS, 2001: 55). 
The timing of the formal presentation of the report in 2001 has not been fortunate 
since it coincided with the launching of the “war on terror”, after the terrorist attacks 
on the US in September that same year, and overshadowed all other issues in the 
international agenda. Coincidently, some of the acquis of the responsibility to protect 
was partially used to legitimize the occupation of Iraq in 2003 (Hehir, 2010), for one of 
the arguments for this preemptive war was the protection of human lives. But, at the 
same time as it was justified with a responsibility to protect, this intervention also 
corroborated all the objections it has been subjected to, for several reasons. First, it 
could be used as an instrument of external imposition of the Great Powers’ will in 
vulnerable states. Second, it opens the way to the possibility of legitimate but illegal 
actions and prevents the necessary authorization from the SC (Chandler, 2004: 60). 
Third, the set of criteria for intervention on the final report of the ICISS can be 
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isolated from its context, becoming valid juridical criteria for any intervention, since 
meeting these criteria would be formally more important than the need for 
intervention; besides, each one of these criteria is subjective and may have different 
interpretations.  
The Outcome Document that emerged from the World Summit in 2005 (UN General 
Assembly, 2005), in its paragraphs 138 and 139, introduced for the first time a 
reference to a “responsibility to protect” in a document produced by the UN. First, it 
is explicitly stated that each state is responsible for the protection of its population 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Second, the 
international community is committed to support populations from the enunciated 
international crimes, using preferably peaceful means, or collective action when 
peaceful means are inadequate or when the state failed in its particular responsibilities; 
any action is supposed to be taken in accordance with the UN Charter and through 
the SC, on a case-by-case basis. Yet the vigorous and unquestionable stress on the 
central role of the SC (Luck, 2008) is remarkable. With these two paragraphs, the 
Outcome Document was able to nullify the controversies over the two most 
problematic criteria presented by the ICISS (just cause and appropriate authority, as 
already mentioned). 
The inclusion of R2P4 in the Outcome Document has nonetheless generated divergent 
opinions on the importance of this achievement. Some, such as Nicholas Wheeler, 
were concerned that the Outcome Document did not give a proper answer on what 
would happen when the SC is unable or unwilling to authorize the use of force 
(Wheeler, 2005: 102). Some other were rather enthusiastic, such as Alex Bellamy, who 
considered the inclusion of R2P in an UN document as one of the most important 
developments achieved on the issue of humanitarian crisis, as it simultaneously formally 
recognized the responsibilities of the states to their own citizens and reaffirmed the 
authority of the SC when it comes to intervention (Bellamy, 2009: 91). 
 
  
                                                          
4 R2P is used here in reference to the whole conceptualization of the responsibility to protect within the 
ICISS report. 
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The debut of R2P in practical terms: Libya 
The recent and current events in Libya seem to add new important elements to the 
discussion on the international community’s responsibility to protect. The Resolution 
1973 (Security Council, 2011b) of the SC authorizes, for the first time, member states 
“to take all necessary measures […] to protect civilians” (Security Council, 2011b), after 
having reiterated that it was the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its citizens. 
In a previous resolution, Resolution 1970 (Security Council, 2011a), the SC already 
warned the Libyan authorities that it was their responsibility to protect their own 
population and that the “widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against 
humanity” (Security Council, 2011a). This particular reference to crimes against 
humanity does not seem to be a minor one, since it refers directly to one of the 
crimes settled at the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document as legitimizing 
international action when the state fails to protect its population. Since the Resolution 
1973 was based on the previous Resolution 1970, there is no doubt that they are in 
line with the concept of the responsibility to protect and constitute already a landmark 
on the application of this controversial concept. 
However positive the inclusion of this concept in a SC Resolution is, some remarks 
arise so as to how this particular event may be determinant on the forthcoming debate 
on the responsibility to protect. First, it seems to be a relative victory for those who 
support a minimalist version of a “responsibility to protect” instead of the broader 
approach sponsored by the ICISS in its final report. On the one hand, this constitutes a 
conceptual appropriation of and a clear recognition of the central role the SC in having 
the responsibility to protect actions and repels the possibility of a “responsibility to 
protect” action to be taken by a non-UN actor, which was not completely repudiated 
in the ICISS report (ICISS, 2001a). On the other hand, the ICISS final report stressed 
the importance of a comprehensive approach of the concept which would contain 
three different responsibilities: to prevent, to react and to reconstruct. Even though 
the academic discussion on R2P has derived gradually towards a more preventive 
approach (Hehir, 2010: 226), the reference to a international community’s 
responsibility to protect in the 2005 World Summit Final Outcome was self-speaking 
for its emphasis on the reaction aspect of R2P. 
Second, the issue of the set of criteria deemed useful by the ICISS in 2001 was 
completely sidelined. This trend was visible already in the 2005 World Summit Final 
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Outcome, when it stated that any collective action under the scope of the 
responsibility to protect was to be decided “on a case-by-case basis” (UN General 
Assembly, 2005). The SC Resolutions on Libya confirm a practice in which too 
narrowly defined criteria can undermine the SC’s decisions and actions. It finally 
confirms that, no matter what reason leads to a collective action, the decision by the 
SC is still based on political reasons rather than on legal grounds (Hehir, 2010: 226). 
Yet, these criteria were always controversial: on the one hand, a list of criteria would 
always be ambiguous, vague and erode the SC’s role in international security 
(Chandler, 2004: 69). On the other hand, the noncompliance with the criteria could 
more easily justify ‘inhumanitarian non-intervention’ than ‘inhumanitarian intervention” 
(Chesterman, 2003: 54), overemphasizing the role of the host state on the 
responsibility to protect (Chandler, 2009). 
Third, this practical application of the concept of a responsibility to protect is not 
particularly innovative. According to Aidan Hehir, even if it has changed the discourse 
on humanitarian interventions, the way the discussions on R2P evolved has gradually 
undermined key issues, such as the reform of the SC, the legitimacy of unilateral 
interventions and the threshold for intervention (Hehir, 2010: 218). One can even 
speculate on whether this international intervention in Libya would have been possible 
anyway, without ten years of debates around R2P; actually, there is no significant 
normative, legal or major institutional development since the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, 
a previous pressing situation in which the SC was bypassed since no political 
agreement could be attained among the permanent members with veto power. 
 
Mapping narratives  
Having briefly analyzed the centrality of a principle such as the R2P in legitimizing the 
intervention in Libya, regardless of the genuine concern of the international community 
on saving lives, and regardless of its future as an international norm, the history of R2P 
will always be told with a reference to Libya as its first major practical test. Hence 
reflecting upon Libya, and more generally on the Arab Spring, it is striking to realize 
that these events have a considerable potential in becoming part of existing narratives, 
or even in shaping them. I will now in a few words map some of the narratives which 
seek to make sense of themselves using the specific mind frame of such outstanding 
phenomenon as the Arab Spring, in registering how this specific story is told, and in 
finding out how each of these narratives appropriates the legacy of the Arab Spring.  
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The uprisings in the Middle East might be understood, for instance, in a larger narrative 
of the popular reaction to the financial crisis in 2007-8. The specific position of most of 
the Arab countries in the economic world-system as oil producers, a world-system 
externally shaped and locally preserved by powerful elites which profit from that 
system, turned them more vulnerable to the crisis and its long-lasting consequences. 
Therefore, the massive demonstrations in Tunis and Cairo might be read at the same 
foot as the ones in Athens for instance (Michael-Matsas, 2011); in both cases, the 
upheavals happened precisely in some of the more fragile, weakest links of that world-
system. The struggle of Wikileaks towards transparency is another narrative that might 
have new developments as substantial proofs of corruption in the regime turned to be 
a trigger for the revolution in Tunisia (Saideman, 2012).  
In a different perspective, the Arab Spring may be a new phase of the “waves of 
democratizations”, according to a narrative proposed by Samuel P. Huntington (1991). 
In case the revolutions lead to more repressive regimes than the starting point, the 
Arab Spring may fit this narrative of waves, as the ebb of the third wave of 
democratization (Huntington, 1991), a common trend with the precedent waves. But 
in case they lead to more liberal regimes, this Arab Spring can also be seen as a part of 
the third wave itself or even be the origin of a brand new fourth wave of 
democratization. More realistically, we might have to consider the possibility of facing 
both successful and defeated revolutions; Tunisia and Egypt got rid of their former 
rulers and are paving their way towards democracy, while the revolution in Syria and 
Libya is/has been endangered by the real threat of civil war and political chaos. The 
presence of given economic and political pre-conditions for democracy might have a 
role in explaining the different outcomes of the revolution in those states, as the 
modernization theory would claim for explaining successful processes of 
democratization (Lipset, 1991). A variation of the theory of the waves might be the 
claim of a supposed “regional tsunami” (Muravchik, 2002) the invasion of Iraq might 
have provoked (Berger, 2012). This tsunami has actually not taken place and one 
cannot convincingly argue that the regime change in Iraq in 2003 was a spark to the 
Arab Spring in 2011 or that change was conceivable only with some sort of external 
intervention. Anyway, claims that democracy in the Arab world would not be possible, 
for cultural, religious or systemic reasons, were badly shaken by these events (Berger, 
2012). 
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One common feature to all these narratives is the existence of a contagion effect from 
one place to another (Alimi and Meyer, 2011; Mansfield and Snyder, 2012), either a 
direct or indirect sort of diffusion (Saideman, 2012). Though there were common 
fragilities in each of these societies, the local circumstances were very diverse 
(Gamson, 2011) and this diversity might explain the variation of intensity of the 
revolutions in the region (Goodwin, 2011); in short, the Arab Spring was less of a 
systemic concussion than a process of emulation from one country to the other.  
But this diffusion seems to have an epidemic background, which turned the Arab 
Spring into an inevitable fact. I would therefore consider that the strongest narrative 
that has taken shape following the popular upheavals in North Africa and the Middle 
East is the one that introduces it as a single event under the name of “Arab Spring”, 
instead of a sum of events sharing some common features or influenced one by another. 
In other words, one might say that “Arab Spring” is more a constructed narrative on a 
perceived single event than the whole set of events themselves. This epidemic feature 
is present in some others narratives of the past, in some specific moments of European 
History that greatly influenced its current shape, such as the liberal revolutions in 1848 
(known as Spring of the People, in the whole continent) and the fall of the Communist 
regimes in 1989 (in East and Central Europe). History would be repeating itself: just 
like in these two revolutionary periods, the Arab Spring would be characterized by the 
domino effect each specific revolution has on the other, as if it became inevitable once 
it started. Robert Springborg (2011) finds more similarities between the Arab Spring 
and 1848 than with 1989, either because there is no common external threat that has 
been lifted (such as the Soviet Union and its new doctrine on sovereignty in 1989) or 
because there is no “carrot”, an incentive for the transformation (such as the promise 
of membership in the European Community) (Springborg, 2011). 
Either way, the international community (among all, Europe as a close neighbor) tried 
not to be too interventive in the development of this Arab Spring, expecting the whole 
domino game to perform by itself until the end. But here, the question arises: why did 
the international community decide to intervene so promptly in Libya, with the active 
support of the UK and France (Saideman, 2012)? Why not in Syria? How can we 
conceive that such a prudent approach to the events across the Mediterranean 
switched so swiftly to such assertiveness? Gaddafi’s Libya was not a security threat in 
2011 anymore; although it has been a pariah in the international system in the 1980s, it 
gradually sided with the US, united against a common enemy during the “War on 
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Terror” (Zimmerer, 2011) and eventually became a key ally of Europe in containing 
the massive immigration coming from Africa, through the Libyan shores (Zimmerer, 
2011). Greed over the Libyan resources were not a driver neither, since some of the 
largest Western oil companies were already present in the exploration of those 
resources (EIA, 2011-2). In this context, I would claim that Gaddafi’s resistance to the 
rebels in Libya soon became a material spoiler in the whole narrative of an Arab Spring 
which some weeks before succeeded in Tunisia and Egypt, and a sudden obstacle to 
the inevitable domino effect of the Revolutions in the remaining Arab world. The 
course of this narrative could also be undermined by the destabilization potential 
which massive flows of refugees escaping from the civil war in Libya could represent to 
its more immediate neighbors, precisely the two first leading characters of the Arab 
Spring. This collective action against this former pariah would not have been possible if 
Libya had strong, committed allies to back its deeds. In fact, there was no single vote 
against the SC Resolution 1973 (2011). That was not the case of Syria: on the one 
hand, the regime is strongly backed by Russia and China (Alimi and Meyer, 2011); on 
the other hand, the narrative of the Arab Spring as a contagious linear domino game 
does not sustain itself anymore… 
 
Concluding remarks 
As to the current situation in Libya and the illations it may have on the evolution of the 
concept of responsibility to protect, the R2P corpus as a whole seems strikingly inflated 
and diverted from the initial challenge made by the Secretariat-General in 2000 “if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights 
that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (UN Secretary General, 2000). The 
ICISS final report was as comprehensive as it could be, highlighting not only the 
importance of a responsibility to react, but also the responsibilities to prevent and to 
reconstruct. As important as these two components can be, this created a too holistic 
R2P corpus, missing a pressing and very precise answer the ICISS was requested for. 
The international reaction to the events in Libya demonstrates that, apart from an 
important rhetoric input, the contribution of R2P to this outcome is quite reduced. 
Nevertheless, a largely non-opposing SC allowed for a timely international reaction in 
Libya, while a similar legally framed reply has not been possible either in Rwanda or in 
Darfur in the 1990s. The creation of a narrative of political liberation in Maghreb and 
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the fact that Muammar Gaddafi has been a spoiler in the regular course of this 
narrative may have pushed for this unusual international mobilization towards a 
“responsibility to react” action. Ten of the 15 members of the SC voted for that 
resolution, with the abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia. On the 
one hand, it can be interesting to analyze why these particular states did not vote in 
favor of the Resolution, in the case of Brazil, Germany and India. But, on the other 
hand, it can be even more interesting to find out why they did not vote against the 
Resolution, in the case of China and Russia, both permanent members of the SC with 
veto power. These two states are considered to have been the stumbling stones that 
impeded a SC mandate for a military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 (Alexander, 
2000), concerned by a similar droit de regard or even intromission on their domestic 
ethnic conflicts by the international community. Given that there is a certain similarity 
between Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011, one can wonder on how to understand 
this shift and perhaps naively argue that even if the responsibility to protect rhetoric 
has not been unequivocally embraced by these two major powers, the insistence and 
intensity around this concept since 2001 made these major actors realize that it has 
become a fact, if not a norm yet.  
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